@Article{brewer99a,
  author =	 {Paul J. Brewer},
  title =	 {Decentralized computation procurement and
                  computational robustness in a smart market},
  journal =	 {Economic Theory},
  year =	 1999,
  volume =	 13,
  number =	 1,
  pages =	 {41--92},
  month =	 {January},
  abstract =	 {Several `smart market' mechanisms have recently
                  appeared in the literature. These mechanisms combine
                  a computer network that collects bids from agents
                  with a central computer that selects a schedule of
                  bids to fill based upon maximization of revenue or
                  trading surplus. Potential problems exist when this
                  optimization involves combinatorial difficulty
                  sufficient to overwhelm the central computer. This
                  paper explores the use of a computation procuring
                  clock auction to induce human agents to approximate
                  the solutions to discrete constrained optimization
                  problems. Economic and computational properties of
                  the auction are studied through a series of
                  laboratory experiments. The experiments are designed
                  around a potential application of the auction as a
                  secondary institution that approximates the solution
                  to difficult computational problems that occur
                  within the primary `smart market', and show that the
                  auction is effective and robust in eliciting and
                  processing suggestions for improved schedules.},
  keywords =     {economics auctions mechanism-design},
  url = 	 {http://jmvidal.cse.sc.edu/library/brewer99a.pdf},
  doi = 	 {10.1007/s001990050242},
  googleid = 	 {AWN9W30vbdEJ:scholar.google.com/},
  cluster = 	 {15090770141840761601}
}