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Title: | Fair Division |
Author: | Steven J. Brams and Alan D. Taylor |
Publisher: | Cambridge University Press |
Year: | 1996 |
ISBN: | 0521556449 |
Abstract: | Cutting a cake, dividing up the property in an estate, determining the borders in an international dispute - such problems of fair division are ubiquitous. Fair Division treats all these problems and many more through a rigorous analysis of a variety of procedures for allocating goods (or `bads' like chores), or deciding who wins on what issues, when there are disputes. Starting with an analysis of the well-known cake-cutting procedure, `I cut, you choose', the authors show how it has been adapted in a number of fields and then analyze fair-division procedures applicable to situations in which there are more than two parties, or there is more than one good to be divided. In particular they focus on procedures which provide `envy-free' allocations, in which everybody thinks he or she has received the largest portion and hence does not envy anybody else. They also discuss the fairness of different auction and election procedures. |
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@Book{brams96a,
author = {Steven J. Brams and Alan D. Taylor},
title = {Fair Division},
publisher = {Cambridge University Press},
year = 1996,
abstract = {Cutting a cake, dividing up the property in an
estate, determining the borders in an international
dispute - such problems of fair division are
ubiquitous. Fair Division treats all these problems
and many more through a rigorous analysis of a
variety of procedures for allocating goods (or
`bads' like chores), or deciding who wins on what
issues, when there are disputes. Starting with an
analysis of the well-known cake-cutting procedure,
`I cut, you choose', the authors show how it has
been adapted in a number of fields and then analyze
fair-division procedures applicable to situations in
which there are more than two parties, or there is
more than one good to be divided. In particular they
focus on procedures which provide `envy-free'
allocations, in which everybody thinks he or she has
received the largest portion and hence does not envy
anybody else. They also discuss the fairness of
different auction and election procedures.},
keywords = {economics game-theory negotiation},
isbn = {0521556449},
googleid = {uDhwkPEbL84J:scholar.google.com/},
cluster = {14857124420042897592},
googleprint = {cLUA-sRhJ5QC}
}
Last modified: Wed Mar 9 10:14:06 EST 2011