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Title: Fair Division
Author: Steven J. Brams and Alan D. Taylor
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Year: 1996
ISBN: 0521556449
Abstract: Cutting a cake, dividing up the property in an estate, determining the borders in an international dispute - such problems of fair division are ubiquitous. Fair Division treats all these problems and many more through a rigorous analysis of a variety of procedures for allocating goods (or `bads' like chores), or deciding who wins on what issues, when there are disputes. Starting with an analysis of the well-known cake-cutting procedure, `I cut, you choose', the authors show how it has been adapted in a number of fields and then analyze fair-division procedures applicable to situations in which there are more than two parties, or there is more than one good to be divided. In particular they focus on procedures which provide `envy-free' allocations, in which everybody thinks he or she has received the largest portion and hence does not envy anybody else. They also discuss the fairness of different auction and election procedures.

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@Book{brams96a,
  author =	 {Steven J. Brams and Alan D. Taylor},
  title =	 {Fair Division},
  publisher =	 {Cambridge University Press},
  year =	 1996,
  abstract =	 {Cutting a cake, dividing up the property in an
                  estate, determining the borders in an international
                  dispute - such problems of fair division are
                  ubiquitous. Fair Division treats all these problems
                  and many more through a rigorous analysis of a
                  variety of procedures for allocating goods (or
                  `bads' like chores), or deciding who wins on what
                  issues, when there are disputes. Starting with an
                  analysis of the well-known cake-cutting procedure,
                  `I cut, you choose', the authors show how it has
                  been adapted in a number of fields and then analyze
                  fair-division procedures applicable to situations in
                  which there are more than two parties, or there is
                  more than one good to be divided. In particular they
                  focus on procedures which provide `envy-free'
                  allocations, in which everybody thinks he or she has
                  received the largest portion and hence does not envy
                  anybody else. They also discuss the fairness of
                  different auction and election procedures.},
  keywords =     {economics game-theory negotiation},
  isbn = 	 {0521556449},
  googleid = 	 {uDhwkPEbL84J:scholar.google.com/},
  cluster = 	 {14857124420042897592},
  googleprint =  {cLUA-sRhJ5QC}
}
Last modified: Wed Mar 9 10:14:06 EST 2011