Vidal's libraryTitle: | Allocating Uncertain and Unresponsive Resources: An Experimental Approach |
Author: | Jeffrey S. Banks, John O. Ledyard, and David P. Porter |
Journal: | The RAND Journal of Economics |
Volume: | 20 |
Number: | 1 |
Pages: | 1--25 |
Year: | 1989 |
Abstract: | We identify an important class of economic problems that arise naturally in several applications: the allocation of multiple resources when there are uncertainties in demand or supply, unresponsive supplies (no inventories and fixed capacities), and significant demand indivisibilities (rigidities). Examples of such problems include: scheduling job shops, airports, or supercomputers; zero-inventory planning; and the allocation and pricing of NASA's planned Space Station. Using experimental methods, we show that the two most common organizations used to deal with this problem, markets and administrative procedures, can perform at very low efficiencies (60-65%) efficiency in a seemingly robust example |
Cited by 123 - Google Scholar
@Article{banks89a,
author = {Jeffrey S. Banks and John O. Ledyard and David
P. Porter},
title = {Allocating Uncertain and Unresponsive Resources: An
Experimental Approach},
journal = {The {RAND} Journal of Economics},
year = 1989,
volume = 20,
number = 1,
pages = {1--25},
abstract = {We identify an important class of economic problems
that arise naturally in several applications: the
allocation of multiple resources when there are
uncertainties in demand or supply, unresponsive
supplies (no inventories and fixed capacities), and
significant demand indivisibilities
(rigidities). Examples of such problems include:
scheduling job shops, airports, or supercomputers;
zero-inventory planning; and the allocation and
pricing of NASA's planned Space Station. Using
experimental methods, we show that the two most
common organizations used to deal with this problem,
markets and administrative procedures, can perform
at very low efficiencies (60-65\%) efficiency in a
seemingly robust example). Thus, there is a need to
design new mechanisms that more efficiently allocate
resources in these environments. We develop and
analyze two mechanisms that arise naturally from
auctions used to allocate single-dimensional
goods. These new mechanisms involve
computer-assisted coordination made possible by the
existence of networked computers. Both mechanisms
significantly improve on the performance of
administrative and market procedures.},
keywords = {economics auctions},
googleid = {zIGoFSqT9Q8J:scholar.google.com/},
url = {http://jmvidal.cse.sc.edu/library/banks89a.pdf},
cluster = {1149987088824304076}
}
Last modified: Wed Mar 9 10:13:46 EST 2011