@Article{azoulay04a,
  author =	 {Rina Azoulay-Schwartz and Sarit Kraus},
  title =	 {Stable repeated strategies for information exchange
                  between two autonomous agents},
  journal =	 {Artificial Intelligence},
  year =	 2004,
  volume =	 154,
  number =	 {1-2},
  pages =	 {43--93},
  abstract =	 {This paper deals with the problem of designing a
                  strategy profile which will enable collaborative
                  interaction between agents. In particular, we
                  consider the problem of information sharing among
                  agents. Providing information in a single
                  interaction as a response to queries is often
                  nonbeneficial. But there are stable strategy
                  profiles that make sharing information beneficial in
                  the long run. This paper presents these types of
                  mechanisms and specifies under which conditions it
                  is beneficial to the agents to answer queries. We
                  analyze a model of repeated encounters in which two
                  agents ask each other queries over time. We present
                  different strategies that enable information
                  exchange, and compare them according to the expected
                  utility for the agents, and the conditions required
                  for the cooperative equilibrium to exist.},
  keywords =     {multiagent game-theory learning},
  doi =		 {10.1016/j.artint.2003.04.002},
  url =		 {http://jmvidal.cse.sc.edu/library/azoulay04a.pdf},
  comment =	 {masrg},
  googleid = 	 {IZUcSekiPvYJ:scholar.google.com/},
  cluster = 	 {17743657967235667233}
}