@InCollection{ausubel06a,
  author =	 {Lawrence M. Ausubel and Paul Milgrom},
  title =	 {The Lovely but Lonely Vickrey Auction},
  booktitle =	 {Combinatorial Auctions},
  crossref =	 {cramton06a},
  pages =	 {17--40},
  year =	 2006,
  chapter =	 1,
  abstract =	 {William Vickrey's (1961) inquiry into auctions and
                  ``counterspeculation'' marked the first serious
                  attempt by an economist to analyze the details of
                  market rules and to design new rules to achieve
                  superior performance. He demonstrated that a
                  particular pricing rule makes it a dominant strategy
                  for bidders to report their values truthfully, even
                  when they know that their reported values will be
                  used to allocate goods efficiently. Vickrey’s
                  discovery was largely ignored for a decade, but the
                  floodgates have since opened. Dozens of studies have
                  extended his design to new environments, developed
                  his associated theory of bidding in auctions, and
                  tested its implications using laboratory experiments
                  and field data.},
  url = 	 {http://jmvidal.cse.sc.edu/library/ausubel06a.pdf},
  cluster = 	 {12896215172473684272},
  keywords = 	 {combinatorial auctions}
}