The answers are in boldface.

  1. The RoboCup simulator system is composed of:

  2. The soccer server communicates with the players using:

  3. In the RoboCup soccerserver when a player kicks a ball that is already moving, what happens? Assume that the ball is in the kickable area. Pick best.

  4. In the RoboCup soccerserver the player gets information about the world in a series of see commands. These commands contain:

  5. The Biter architecture uses the concept of independent activities (or behaviors). The most important member functions for these activities are:

  6. The main contribution of Biter's WorldModel is that it provides:

  7. N worker ants can carry a weight proportional to:

  8. The ants' Long Range Recruitment strategy consists of:

  9. Stigmergy is

  10. In the initial experiments with robotic box-pushing the box would sometimes not move. This problem was solved by:

  11. The task model used by the robots in the box-pushing experiments most resembles:

  12. Game theory was first introduced by

  13. The fact that I know that you know that I know (ad infinitum) about P, is referred to as:

  14. In game theory, an individually rational agent acts so as to

  15. A strategy S is said to be Pareto optimal if

  16. A strategy S is said to be a Nash equilibrium if

  17. A strategy S is said to be the social welfare strategy if:

  18. The Prisoner's Dilemma is a dilemma because:

  19. What is the Nash Equilibrium of this game matrix?

    Bob   A B
    A 9,16 0,0
    B 6,6 14,8

  20. What is the Pareto Optimal equilibrium of this game matrix?

    Bob   A B
    A 9,16 0,0
    B 6,6 14,8

  21. What is the social welfare solution of this game matrix?

    Bob   A B
    A 1,16 0,0
    B 6,6 8,8

  22. The Borda count seems more fair because

  23. Arrow's Impossibility Theorem tells us that

  24. The Clarke Tax is

    There is no equilibrium solution in voting.

  25. A common value action is one where

  26. An English auction is a:

    There is no "shared value".

  27. In a private value auction with risk-neutral bidders, which of the following mechanism will get the seller more money.

  28. In a correlated value auction with risk-neutral bidders, which of the following mechanism will get the seller more money.

  29. Which types of auctions self-enforce bidder collusion deals?

  30. The reason the Vickrey auction is not used by humans much is that:

  31. Inefficient allocation arises in interrelated auctions when

  32. In the TAC competition there were two main strategies used by the players, they were:

  33. The winner's curse can only happen if the auction is

  34. In Vickrey auction with private value a risk-neutral agent could be encouraged to counterspeculate if

  35. In Axiomatic Bargaining Theory

  36. If two players are trying to split $100 using the Nash Bargaining solution. Player 1 has utility U1 = X, where X is the amount of money it gets. Player 2 has U2 = 2*Y, where Y is what 2 gets. The fallback deal has zero utility for both. The deal that the Nash Bargaining solution finds will be the one that maximizes (where X is what player 1 gets).

  37. Two agents are engaged in bargaining for a good of initial value 1 but whose value is decreased by multiplying it by .9 at each time. The game can be summarized with the table below (as seen in class). If the final time is t=5, what will agent 1 get if a deal is struck at time 2 (in absolute terms, not in percentage of the total value)?

    Round 1's share 2's share Total value Offerer
    t-3 .819 .181 .9t-4 2
    t-2 .91 .09 .9t-3 1
    t-1 .9 .1 .9t-2 2
    t 1 0 .9t-1 1
    Offerer's maximal acceptable claims in a finite game.

  38. The task allocation problem consists of a set of tasks that must be allocated to a set of agents where:

  39. OCSM contracts allow contract net to, eventually, find the optimal task allocation because:

  40. In a coalition formation problem with A agents, we can bound the utility of the best possible coalition structure to within A*S', where S' is the best one we have found so far by:

Copyright © 2001 José M. Vidal. All Rights Reserved.