@Article{zlotkin96a,
  author =	 {Gilad Zlotkin and Jeffrey S. Rosenschein},
  title =	 {Mechanism design for automated negotiation, and its
                  application to task oriented domains},
  journal =	 {Artificial Intelligence},
  year =	 1996,
  volume =	 86,
  number =	 2,
  pages =	 {195--244},
  abstract =	 {As distributed systems of computers play an
                  increasingly important role in society, it will be
                  necessary to consider ways in which these machines
                  can be made to interact effectively. Especially when
                  the interacting machines have been independently
                  designed, it is essential that the interaction
                  environment be conducive to the aims of their
                  designers. These designers might, for example, wish
                  their machines to behave efficiently, and with a
                  minimum of overhead required by the coordination
                  mechanism itself. The rules of interaction should
                  satisfy these needs, and others. Formal tools and
                  analysis can help in the appropriate design of these
                  rules. We here consider how concepts from game
                  theory can provide standards to be used in the
                  design of appropriate negotiation and interaction
                  environments. This design is highly sensitive to the
                  domain in which the interaction is taking
                  place. Different interaction mechanisms are suitable
                  for different domains, if attributes like efficiency
                  and stability are to be maintained. We present a
                  general theory that captures the relationship
                  between certain domains and negotiation
                  mechanisms. The analysis makes it possible to
                  categorize precisely the kinds of domains in which
                  agents find themselves, and to use the category to
                  choose appropriate negotiation mechanisms. The
                  theory presented here both generalizes previous
                  results, and allows agent designers to characterize
                  new domains accurately. The analysis thus serves as
                  a critical step in using the theory of negotiation
                  in real-world applications. We show that in certain
                  task oriented domains, there exist distributed
                  consensus mechanisms with simple and stable
                  strategies that lead to efficient outcomes, even
                  when agents have incomplete information about their
                  environment. We also present additional novel
                  results, in particular that in concave domains using
                  all-or-nothing deals, no lying by an agent can be
                  beneficial, and that in subadditive domains, there
                  often exist beneficial decoy lies that do not
                  require full information regarding the other agent's
                  goals.},
  doi = 	 {10.1016/0004-3702(95)00104-2},
  url = 	 {http://jmvidal.cse.sc.edu/library/zlotkin06a.pdf},
  cluster = 	 {9903339601667577880},
  keywords = 	 {multiagent negotiation mechanism-design}
}