@Article{wellman01a,
  author =	 {Michael P. Wellman and William E. Walsh and Peter
                  R. Wurman and Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason},
  title =	 {Auction Protocols for Decentralized Scheduling},
  googleid =	 {PLrv7yO2ljkJ:scholar.google.com/},
  journal =	 {Games and Economic Behavior},
  year =	 2001,
  volume =	 35,
  pages =	 {217--303},
  doi =		 {10.1006 game.2000.0822},
  abstract =	 {Decentralized scheduling is the problem of
                  allocating resources to alternative possible uses
                  over time, where competing uses are represented by
                  autonomous agents. Market mechanisms use prices
                  derived through distributing bidding protocols to
                  determine schedules. We investigate the existence of
                  equilibrium prices for some general classes of
                  scheduling problems, the quality of equilibrium
                  solutions, and the behavior of an ascending auction
                  mechanism and bidding protocol. To remedy the
                  potential nonexistence of price equilibria due to
                  complementarities in preference, we introduce
                  additional markets in combinations of basic
                  goods. Finally, we consider direct revelation
                  mechanisms and compare to the market-based
                  approach.},
  keywords =     {combinatorial auctions scheduling},
  url =		 {http://jmvidal.cse.sc.edu/library/wellman01a.pdf},
  cluster = 	 {4149704372134066748}
}