@Article{vries03a,
  author =	 {Sven de Vries and Rakesh V. Vohra},
  title =	 {Combinatorial Auctions: A Survey},
  googleid =	 {MsZgn3fTxucJ:scholar.google.com/},
  journal =	 {{INFORMS} Journal on Computing},
  year =	 2003,
  volume =	 15,
  number =	 3,
  pages =	 {284--309},
  month =	 {Summer},
  abstract =	 {Many auctions involve the sale of a variety of
                  distinct assets. Examples are airport time slots,
                  delivery routes and furniture. Because of
                  complementarities (or substitution e ects) between
                  the di erent assets, bidders have preferences not
                  just for particular items but for sets or bundles of
                  items. For this reason, economic e ciency is
                  enhanced if bidders are allowed to bid on bundles or
                  combinations of di erent assets. This paper surveys
                  the state of knowledge about the design of
                  combinatorial auctions. Second, it uses this subject
                  as a vehicle to convey the aspects of integer
                  programming that are relevant for the design of such
                  auctions and combinatorial markets in
                  general. (Auctions; Combinatorial Optimization )},
  keywords =     {combinatorial auctions survey},
  url =		 {http://jmvidal.cse.sc.edu/library/vries03a.pdf},
  cluster = 	 {16701268778878551602}
}