@InCollection{vidal03a,
  author = 	 {Jos\'{e} M. Vidal},
  title = 	 {Learning in Multiagent Systems: An Introduction from a Game-Theoretic Perspective},
  booktitle = 	 {Adaptive Agents: LNAI 2636},
  publisher =	 {Springer Verlag},
  year =	 2003,
  editor =	 {Eduardo Alonso},
  pages = 	 {202--215},
  abstract = 	 {We introduce the topic of learning in multiagent
                  systems. We first provide a quick introduction to
                  the field of game theory, focusing on the
                  equilibrium concepts of iterated dominance, and Nash
                  equilibrium.  We show some of the most relevant
                  findings in the theory of learning in games,
                  including theorems on fictitious play, replicator
                  dynamics, and evolutionary stable strategies. The
                  CLRI theory and n-level learning agents are
                  introduced as attempts to apply some of these
                  findings to the problem of engineering multiagent
                  systems with learning agents. Finally, we summarize
                  some of the remaining challenges in the field of
                  learning in multiagent systems.},
  url = 	 {http://jmvidal.cse.sc.edu/papers/vidal03a.pdf},
  arxiv = 	 {cs.MA/0308030},
  googleid = 	 {A37Za40rI5EJ:scholar.google.com/},
  keywords = 	 {multiagent learning survey},
  cluster = 	 {10458250646084222467}
}