Vidal's library
Title: Strategy/False-name Proof Protocols for Combinatorial Multi-Attribute Procurement Auction
Author: Takayuki Suyama and Makoto Yokoo
Book Tittle: Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems
Pages: 160--167
Publisher: ACM
Year: 2004
Abstract: In this paper, we investigate a model of a combinatorial, procurement multi-attribute auction, in which each sales item is defined by several attributes called quality, the buyer is the auctioneer (e.g., a government), and the sellers are the bidders. Furthermore, there exist multiple items and both buyer and sellers can have arbitrary (e.g., substitutable/complementary) preferences on a bundle of items. Our goal is to develop a protocol that is strategyproof for sellers. We first present a VCG-type protocol. As in a standard combinatorial auction, a VCG-type protocol is not false-name-proof, i.e., it is vulnerable against manipulations using multiple identifiers. Next, we show that any strategy-proof protocol in this model can be represented as a framework called Price-Oriented Rationing-Free (PORF) protocol, in which for each bidder, for each bundle of items, and for each quality, the payment for the bidder is determined independently of his own declaration, and the bidder can obtain a bundle that maximizes his utility independently of the allocations of other bidders. We develop a false-name-proof protocol in this model.

Cited by 13  -  Google Scholar

@InProceedings{suyama04a,
  author =	 {Takayuki Suyama and Makoto Yokoo},
  title =	 {Strategy/False-name Proof Protocols for
                  Combinatorial Multi-Attribute Procurement Auction},
  booktitle =	 {Proceedings of the Third International Joint
                  Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent
                  Systems},
  pages =	 {160--167},
  year =	 2004,
  publisher =	 {{ACM}},
  abstract =	 {In this paper, we investigate a model of a
                  combinatorial, procurement multi-attribute auction,
                  in which each sales item is defined by several
                  attributes called quality, the buyer is the
                  auctioneer (e.g., a government), and the sellers are
                  the bidders. Furthermore, there exist multiple items
                  and both buyer and sellers can have arbitrary (e.g.,
                  substitutable/complementary) preferences on a bundle
                  of items. Our goal is to develop a protocol that is
                  strategyproof for sellers. We first present a
                  VCG-type protocol. As in a standard combinatorial
                  auction, a VCG-type protocol is not
                  false-name-proof, i.e., it is vulnerable against
                  manipulations using multiple identifiers. Next, we
                  show that any strategy-proof protocol in this model
                  can be represented as a framework called
                  Price-Oriented Rationing-Free (PORF) protocol, in
                  which for each bidder, for each bundle of items, and
                  for each quality, the payment for the bidder is
                  determined independently of his own declaration, and
                  the bidder can obtain a bundle that maximizes his
                  utility independently of the allocations of other
                  bidders. We develop a false-name-proof protocol in
                  this model.},
  keywords =     {multiagent auctions security combinatorial},
  url =		 {http://jmvidal.cse.sc.edu/library/suyama04a.pdf},
  comment =	 {masrg},
  googleid = 	 {8-sqX6mRgbEJ:scholar.google.com/},
  cluster = 	 {12790664573341068275}
}
Last modified: Wed Mar 9 10:16:13 EST 2011