Vidal's libraryTitle: | On the emergence of social conventions: modeling, analysis, and simulations |
Author: | Yoav Shoham and Moshe Tennenholtz |
Journal: | Artificial Intelligence |
Volume: | 94 |
Pages: | 139--166 |
Year: | 1997 |
Abstract: | We define the notion of social conventions in a standard game-theoretic framework, and identify various criteria of consistency of such conventions with the principle of individual rationality. We then investigate the emergence of such conventions in a stochastic setting; we do so within a stylized framework currently popular in economic circles, namely that of stochastic games. This framework comes in several forms; in our setting agents interact with each other through a random process, and accumulate information about the system. As they do so, they continually reevaluate their current choice of strategy in light of the accumulated information. We introduce a simple and natural strategy-selection rule, called highest cumulative reward (HCR). We show a class of games in which HCR guarantees eventual convergence to a rationally acceptable social convention. Most importantly, we investigate the efficiency with which such social conventions are achieved. We give an analytic lower bound on this rate, and then present results about how HCR works out in practice. Specifically, we pick one of the most basic games, namely a basic coordination game (as defined by Lewis), and through extensive computer simulations determine not only the effect of applying HCR, but also the subtle effects of various system parameters, such as the amount of memory and the frequency of update performed by all agents. |
Cited by 0 - Google Scholar
@Article{shoham97a,
author = {Yoav Shoham and Moshe Tennenholtz},
title = {On the emergence of social conventions: modeling,
analysis, and simulations},
googleid = {MnR3R4DssjcJ:scholar.google.com/},
journal = {Artificial Intelligence},
year = 1997,
volume = 94,
pages = {139--166},
abstract = {We define the notion of social conventions in a
standard game-theoretic framework, and identify
various criteria of consistency of such conventions
with the principle of individual rationality. We
then investigate the emergence of such conventions
in a stochastic setting; we do so within a stylized
framework currently popular in economic circles,
namely that of stochastic games. This framework
comes in several forms; in our setting agents
interact with each other through a random process,
and accumulate information about the system. As they
do so, they continually reevaluate their current
choice of strategy in light of the accumulated
information. We introduce a simple and natural
strategy-selection rule, called highest cumulative
reward (HCR). We show a class of games in which HCR
guarantees eventual convergence to a rationally
acceptable social convention. Most importantly, we
investigate the efficiency with which such social
conventions are achieved. We give an analytic lower
bound on this rate, and then present results about
how HCR works out in practice. Specifically, we pick
one of the most basic games, namely a basic
coordination game (as defined by Lewis), and through
extensive computer simulations determine not only
the effect of applying HCR, but also the subtle
effects of various system parameters, such as the
amount of memory and the frequency of update
performed by all agents.},
keywords = {multiagent learning game-theory},
url = {http://jmvidal.cse.sc.edu/library/shoham97a.pdf},
cluster = {4013530253639513138}
}
Last modified: Wed Mar 9 10:14:12 EST 2011