@Article{roth04a,
  author =	 {Alvin E. Roth and Taygun S\"{o}nmez and M. Utku
                  \"{U}nver},
  title =	 {Kidney Exchange},
  journal =	 {The Quaterly Journal of Economics},
  year =	 2004,
  volume =	 119,
  number =	 2,
  pages =	 {457--488},
  doi =		 {10.1162/0033553041382157},
  abstract =	 {Most transplanted kidneys are from cadavers, but
                  there are also many transplants from live
                  donors. Recently, there have started to be kidney
                  exchanges involving two donor-patient pairs such
                  that each donor cannot give a kidney to the intended
                  recipient because of immunological incompatibility,
                  but each patient can receive a kidney from the other
                  donor. Exchanges are also made in which a
                  donor-patient pair makes a donation to someone
                  waiting for a cadaver kidney, in return for the
                  patient in the pair receiving high priority for a
                  compatible cadaver kidney when one becomes
                  available. There are stringent legal/ethical
                  constraints on how exchanges can be conducted. We
                  explore how larger scale exchanges of these kinds
                  can be arranged efficiently and incentive
                  compatibly, within existing constraints. The problem
                  resembles some of the ``housing'' problems studied
                  in the mechanism design literature for indivisible
                  goods, with the novel feature that while live donor
                  kidneys can be assigned simultaneously, cadaver
                  kidneys cannot. In addition to studying the
                  theoretical properties of the proposed kidney
                  exchange, we present simulation results suggesting
                  that the welfare gains from larger scale exchange
                  would be substantial, both in increased number of
                  feasible live donation transplants, and in improved
                  match quality of transplanted kidneys.},
  url = 	 {http://jmvidal.cse.sc.edu/library/roth04a.pdf},
  cluster = 	 {13719129550819237930}
}