@TechReport{park01a,
  author =	 {Sunju Park and Michael H. Rothkopf},
  title =	 {Auctions with Endogenously Determined Allowable
                  Combinations},
  institution =	 {Rutgets Center for Operations Research},
  year =	 2001,
  month =	 {January},
  note =	 {{RRR} 3-2001},
  abstract =	 {Combinatorial auctions are desirable as they enable
                  bidders to express the synergistic values of a group
                  of assets and thus may lead to better
                  allocations. Compared to other auctions, they keep
                  bidders from being exposed to risks (of receiving
                  only parts of combinations that would be valuable to
                  them) or from being overly cautious (in order to
                  minimize such risks). However, determining the
                  optimal winning combination in a general
                  combinatorial auction is computationally
                  intractable, and this is sometimes given as a reason
                  for not using combinatorial auctions. To insure
                  computational tractability, a bid taker might try to
                  limit the kinds of allowable combinations, but
                  bidders may disagree on what combinations should be
                  allowed, and this may make limiting the allowable
                  combinations politically infeasible. This paper
                  proposes and tests successfully a new approach to
                  managing the computational complexity of determining
                  the winning combination. The main idea is to let
                  bidders determine and prioritize the allowable
                  combinations. Using endogenously determined
                  combinations has two nice properties. First, by
                  delegating the decision on what is biddable to the
                  bidders who know what combinations are important to
                  them, the bid taker is able to be (and appear)
                  fair. Second, bidder prioritization of combinations
                  assures that the economically most important
                  combinations are included in determining the winning
                  set of bids even when the bid taker is not able to
                  use all the combinations submitted by bidders.},
  keywords =     {economics combinatorial auctions multiagent},
  url = 	 {http://jmvidal.cse.sc.edu/library/park01a.pdf},
  googleid = 	 {PqsShhd0UZ0J:scholar.google.com/},
  cluster = 	 {11335969381450689342}
}