@Article{nisan01a,
  author =	 {Noam Nisan and Amir Ronen},
  title =	 {Algorithmic Mechanism Design },
  googleid =	 {obXr1YlWgjcJ:scholar.google.com/},
  journal =	 {Games and Economic Behavior},
  year =	 2001,
  volume =	 35,
  pages =	 {166--196},
  abstract =	 {We consider algorithmic problems in a distributed
                  setting where the participants cannot be assumed to
                  follow the algorithm but rather their own
                  self-interest. As such participants, termed agents,
                  are capable of manipulating the algorithm, the
                  algorithm designer should ensure in advance that the
                  agents' interests are best served by behaving
                  correctly. Following notions from the field of
                  mechanism design, we suggest a framework for
                  studying such algorithms. Our main technical
                  contribution concerns the study of a representative
                  task scheduling problem for which the standard
                  mechanism design tools do not suffice.},
  keywords =     {multiagent mechanism-design classic},
  url =		 {http://jmvidal.cse.sc.edu/library/nisan01a.pdf},
  doi =		 {10.1006/game.1999.0790},
  cluster = 	 {3999854569057924513}
}