@InProceedings{littman03a,
  author =	 {Michael L. Littman and Peter Stone},
  title =	 {A polynomial-time Nash Equilibrium Algorithm for
                  Repeated Games},
  booktitle =	 {Proceedings of the 4th ACM conference on Electronic
                  commerce},
  pages =	 {48--54},
  location =	 {San Diego, CA, USA},
  doi =		 {10.1145/779928.779935},
  publisher =	 {{ACM} Press},
  address =	 {New York, {NY}, {USA}},
  year =	 2003,
  abstract =	 {With the increasing reliance on game theory as a
                  foundation for auctions and electronic commerce,
                  efficient algorithms for computing equilibria in
                  multiplayer general-sum games are of great
                  theoretical and practical interest. The
                  computational complexity of finding a Nash
                  equilibrium for a one-shot bimatrix game is a well
                  known open problem. This paper treats a closely
                  related problem, that of finding a Nash equilibrium
                  for an average-payoff phrepeated bimatrix game, and
                  presents a polynomial-time algorithm. Our approach
                  draws on the "folk theorem" from game theory and
                  shows how finite-state equilibrium strategies can be
                  found efficiently and expressed succinctly.},
  url =		 {http://jmvidal.cse.sc.edu/library/littman03a.pdf},
  cluster =	 {7404242883626535424},
  keywords = 	 {game-theory learning}
}