@Article{lehmann02a,
  author =	 {Daniel Lehmann and Laidan Ita Ocallaghan and Yoav
                  Shoham},
  title =	 {Truth revelation in approximately efficient
                  combinatorial auctions},
  journal =	 {Journal of the {ACM}},
  year =	 2002,
  volume =	 49,
  number =	 5,
  abstract =	 {Some important classical mechanisms considered in
                  Microeconomics and Game Theory require the solution
                  of a difficult optimization problem. This is true of
                  mechanisms for combinatorial auctions, which have in
                  recent years assumed practical importance, and in
                  particular of the gold standard for combinatorial
                  auctions, the Generalized Vickrey Auction
                  (GVA). Traditional analysis of these mechanisms---in
                  particular, their truth revelation
                  properties---assumes that the optimization problems
                  are solved precisely. In reality, these optimization
                  problems can usually be solved only in an
                  approximate fashion. We investigate the impact on
                  such mechanisms of replacing exact solutions by
                  approximate ones. Specifically, we look at a
                  particular greedy optimization method. We show that
                  the GVA payment scheme does not provide for a truth
                  revealing mechanism. We introduce another scheme
                  that does guarantee truthfulness for a restricted
                  class of players. We demonstrate the latter property
                  by identifying natural properties for combinatorial
                  auctions and showing that, for our restricted class
                  of players, they imply that truthful strategies are
                  dominant. Those properties have applicability beyond
                  the specific auction studied.},
  url = 	 {http://jmvidal.cse.sc.edu/library/lehmann02a.pdf},
  doi = 	 {10.1145/585265.585266},
  cluster = 	 {5741541263507192013},
  keywords = 	 {combinatorial auctions}
}