@InProceedings{larson05a,
  author =	 {Kate Larson and Tuomas Sandholm},
  title =	 {Mechanism Design and Deliberative Agents},
  booktitle =	 {Proceedings of the Fourth International Joint
                  Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent
                  Systems},
  crossref =	 {aamas05},
  pages =	 {650--656},
  year =	 2005,
  abstract =	 {The central mechanism design problem is to develop
                  incentives for agents to truthfully reveal their
                  preferences over different outcomes, so that the
                  system-wide outcome chosen by the mechanism
                  appropriately re¤ects these preferences. However, in
                  many settings, agents’ do not know their actual
                  preferences a priori. Instead, an agent may need to
                  compute or gather information to determine whether
                  they prefer one possible outcome over another. Due
                  to time constraints or the cost of acquiring
                  information, agents must be deliberative in that
                  they need to carefully decide how to allocate their
                  computational or information gathering resources
                  when determining their preferences. In this paper we
                  study the problem of designing mechanisms explicitly
                  for deliberative agents. We propose a set of
                  intuitive properties which we argue are desirable in
                  deliberative-agent settings. We show that these
                  properties are mutually incompatible, and that many
                  approaches to mechanism design are not robust
                  against undesirable behavior from deliberative
                  agents.},
  keywords =     {multiagent mechanism-design},
  url = 	 {http://jmvidal.cse.sc.edu/library/larson05a.pdf},
  googleid = 	 {XdueUjynlK8J:scholar.google.com/},
  cluster = 	 {12651921130716584797}
}