@Article{ileri05a,
  author =	 {Omer Ileri and Siun-Chuon Mau and Narayan
                  B. Mandayam},
  title =	 {Pricing for Enabling Forwarding in Self-Configuring
                  Ad Hoc Networks},
  journal =	 {{IEEE} Journal on Selected Areas in Communications},
  year =	 2005,
  volume =	 23,
  number =	 1,
  pages =	 {151--163},
  abstract =	 {The assumption that all nodes cooperate to relay
                  packets for each other may not be realistic for
                  commercial wireless ad hoc networks. An autonomous
                  (selfish) node in a wireless network has two
                  disincentives for forwarding for others: energy
                  expenditure (real cost) and possible delays for its
                  own data (opportunity cost). We introduce a
                  mechanism that ``fosters cooperation through bribery''
                  in the context of forwarding in ad hoc
                  networks. Using a microeconomic framework based on
                  game theory, we design and analyze a pricing
                  algorithm that encourages forwarding among
                  autonomous nodes by reimbursing forwarding. Taking a
                  joint network-centric and user-centric approach, the
                  revenue maximizing network and utility (measured in
                  bits-per-Joule) maximizing nodes interact through
                  prices for channel use, reimbursements for
                  forwarding, transmitter power control, as well as
                  forwarding and destination preferences. In a
                  three-node (two-sources, one-access-point) network,
                  the network converges to an architecture that
                  induces forwarding only when the network geometries
                  are such that forwarding is likely to increase
                  individual benefits (network revenue and node
                  utilities). For other geometries, the network
                  converges to architectures that do not favor
                  forwarding. We then generalize to a multinode
                  network, where it is seen that the nodes'
                  willingness to forward decrease for large ratios of
                  the average internodal distance to the smallest
                  distance between the access point and any source
                  node. Pricing with reimbursement generally improves
                  the network aggregate utility (or aggregate
                  bits-per-Joule), as well as utilities and revenue
                  compared with the corresponding pricing algorithm
                  without reimbursement.},
  url = 	 {http://jmvidal.cse.sc.edu/library/ileri05a.pdf},
  doi = 	 {10.1109/JSAC.2004.837356},
  cluster = 	 {11667759843120903936}
}