@InProceedings{hudson04a,
  author =	 {Benoit Hudson and Tuomas Sandholm},
  title =	 {Effectiveness of Query Types and Policies for
                  Preference Elicitation in Combinatorial Auctions},
  booktitle =	 {Proceedings of the Third International Joint
                  Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent
                  Systems},
  crossref =	 {aamas04},
  year =	 2004,
  abstract =	 {Combinatorial auctions, where agents can bid on
                  bundles of items (resources, tasks, etc.), are
                  desirable because the agents can express
                  complementarity and substitutability among the
                  items. However, expressing one's preferences can
                  require bidding on all bundles. We evaluate an
                  approach known as incremental preference elicitation
                  [3] and show that as the number of items increases,
                  the amount of information required to clear the
                  auction is a vanishing fraction of the information
                  collected in direct revelation mechanisms. Most of
                  the elicitors also maintain the benefit as the
                  number of agents increases. We prove that
                  randomization helps, in that no deterministic
                  elicitor is a universal revelation reducer. Finally,
                  we present a new query type that allows agents to
                  use anytime algorithms to give approximate answers
                  that are refined only as needed.},
  keywords =     {multiagent combinatorial auctions},
  url = 	 {http://jmvidal.cse.sc.edu/library/hudson04a.pdf},
  googleid = 	 {tbfuctCjRpMJ:scholar.google.com/},
  cluster = 	 {10612349687621924789}
}