@Book{fudenberg98a,
  author =	 {Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine},
  title =	 {The Theory of Learning in Games},
  googleid =	 {PnrZxufOknwJ:scholar.google.com/},
  publisher =	 {{MIT} Press},
  year =	 1998,
  abstract =	 {In economics, most noncooperative game theory has
                  focused on equilibrium in games, especially Nash
                  equilibrium and its refinements. The traditional
                  explanation for when and why equilibrium arises is
                  that it results from analysis and introspection by
                  the players in a situation where the rules of the
                  game, the rationality of the players, and the
                  players' payoff functions are all common
                  knowledge. Both conceptually and empirically, this
                  theory has many problems. In The Theory of Learning
                  in Games Drew Fudenberg and David Levine develop an
                  alternative explanation that equilibrium arises as
                  the long-run outcome of a process in which less than
                  fully rational players grope for optimality over
                  time. The models they explore provide a foundation
                  for equilibrium theory and suggest useful ways for
                  economists to evaluate and modify traditional
                  equilibrium concepts.},
  keywords =     {game-theory learning textbook},
  isbn =	 {0262061945},
  cluster = 	 {8976464502171728446}
}