@Article{fudenberg86a,
  author =	 {Drew Fudenberg and Eric Maskin},
  title =	 {The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting
                  or with Incomplete Information},
  journal =	 {Econometrica},
  year =	 1986,
  volume =	 54,
  number =	 3,
  pages =	 {533--554},
  abstract =	 { When either there are only two players or a "full
                  dimensionality" condition holds, any individually
                  rational payoff vector of a one-shot game of
                  complete information can arise in a perfect
                  equilibrium of the infinitely-repeated game if
                  players are sufficiently patient. In contrast to
                  earlier work, mixed strategies are allowed in
                  determining the individually rational payoffs (even
                  when only realized actions are observable). Any
                  individually rational payoffs of a one-shot game can
                  be approximated by sequential equilibrium payoffs of
                  a long but finite game of incomplete information,
                  where players' payoffs are almost certainly as in
                  the one-shot game.},
  url = 	 {http://jmvidal.cse.sc.edu/library/fudenberg86a.pdf},
  cluster = 	 {9204460992913534317}
}