@InProceedings{fatima05a,
  author =	 {Shaheen Fatima and Michael Wooldridge and Nicholar
                  R. Jennings},
  title =	 {Sequential Auctions for Objects with Common and
                  Private Values},
  booktitle =	 {Proceedings of the Fourth International Joint
                  Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent
                  Systems},
  crossref =	 {aamas05},
  pages =	 {635--642},
  year =	 2005,
  abstract =	 {Sequential auctions are an important mechanism for
                  buying/selling multiple objects. Existing work has
                  studied sequential auctions for objects that are
                  exclusively either common value or private
                  value. However, in many real-world cases an object
                  has both features. Also, in such cases, the common
                  value component (which is the same for all bidders)
                  depends on how much each bidder values the
                  object. Moreover, an individual bidder generally
                  does not know the true common value, since it may
                  not know how much the other bidders value it. On the
                  other hand, a bidder's private value is independent
                  of the others' private values. Given this, we study
                  settings that have both common and private value
                  elements by treating each bidder's information
                  about the common value as uncertain. We first
                  determine equilibrium bidding strategies for each
                  auction in a sequence using English auction
                  rules. On the basis of this equilibrium, we analyse
                  the efficiency of auctions. Specifically, we show
                  that the inefficiency that arises as a result of
                  uncertainty about the common values can be reduced
                  if the auctioneer makes its information about the
                  common value known to all bidders. Moreover, our
                  analysis also shows that the efficiency of auctions
                  in an agent-based setting is higher than that in an
                  all-human setting.},
  keywords =     {multiagent auctions},
  url = 	 {http://jmvidal.cse.sc.edu/library/fatima05a.pdf},
  googleid = 	 {OC1OvxErUgUJ:scholar.google.com/},
  cluster = 	 {383416273503923512}
}