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Title: An agenda-based framework for multi-issue negotiation
Author: Shaheen S. Fatima, Michael Wooldridge, and Nicholas R. Jennings
Journal: Artificial Intelligence
Volume: 152
Number: 1
Pages: 1--45
Month: jan
Year: 2004
DOI: 10.1016/S0004-3702(03)00115-2
Abstract: This paper presents a new model for multi-issue negotiation under time constraints in an incomplete information setting. The issues to be bargained over can be associated with a single good/service or multiple goods/services. In our agenda-based model, the order in which issues are bargained over and agreements are reached is determined endogenously, as part of the bargaining equilibrium. In this context we determine the conditions under which agents have similar preferences over the implementation scheme and the conditions under which they have conflicting preferences. Our analysis shows the existence of equilibrium even when both players have uncertain information about each other, and each agent' information is its private knowledge. We also study the properties of the equilibrium solution and determine conditions under which it is unique, symmetric, and Pareto ptimal.

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@Article{fatima04a,
  author =	 {Shaheen S. Fatima and Michael Wooldridge and
                  Nicholas R. Jennings},
  title =	 {An agenda-based framework for multi-issue
                  negotiation},
  googleid =	 {AhSeJ15Scv4J:scholar.google.com/},
  journal =	 {Artificial Intelligence},
  year =	 2004,
  volume =	 152,
  number =	 1,
  pages =	 {1--45},
  month =	 jan,
  abstract =	 {This paper presents a new model for multi-issue
                  negotiation under time constraints in an incomplete
                  information setting. The issues to be bargained over
                  can be associated with a single good/service or
                  multiple goods/services. In our agenda-based model,
                  the order in which issues are bargained over and
                  agreements are reached is determined endogenously,
                  as part of the bargaining equilibrium. In this
                  context we determine the conditions under which
                  agents have similar preferences over the
                  implementation scheme and the conditions under which
                  they have conflicting preferences. Our analysis
                  shows the existence of equilibrium even when both
                  players have uncertain information about each other,
                  and each agent' information is its private
                  knowledge. We also study the properties of the
                  equilibrium solution and determine conditions under
                  which it is unique, symmetric, and Pareto ptimal.},
  keywords =     {multiagent negotiation},
  url =		 {http://jmvidal.cse.sc.edu/library/fatima04a.pdf},
  doi =		 {10.1016/S0004-3702(03)00115-2},
  comment =	 {masrg},
  cluster = 	 {18334807597323785218}
}
Last modified: Wed Mar 9 10:16:11 EST 2011