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Title: Combinatorial Auctions
Editor: Peter Cramton, Yoav Shoham, and Richard Steinberg
Publisher: MIT Press
Year: 2006
ISBN: 0262033429
Abstract: The study of combinatorial auctions -- auctions in which bidders can bid on combinations of items or "packages" -- draws on the disciplines of economics, operations research, and computer science. This landmark collection integrates these three perspectives, offering a state-of-the art survey of developments in combinatorial auction theory and practice by leaders in the field. Combinatorial auctions (CAs), by allowing bidders to express their preferences more fully, can lead to improved economic efficiency and greater auction revenues. However, challenges arise in both design and implementation. Combinatorial Auctions addresses each of these challenges. After describing and analyzing various CA mechanisms, the book addresses bidding languages and questions of efficiency. Possible strategies for solving the computationally intractable problem of how to compute the objective-maximizing allocation (known as the winner determination problem) are considered, as are questions of how to test alternative algorithms. The book discusses five important applications of CAs: spectrum auctions, airport takeoff and landing slots, procurement of freight transportation services, the London bus routes market, and industrial procurement. This unique collection makes recent work in CAs available to a broad audience of researchers and practitioners. The integration of work from the three disciplines underlying CAs, using a common language throughout, serves to advance the field in theory and practice.

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@Book{cramton06a,
  editor =	 {Peter Cramton and Yoav Shoham and Richard Steinberg},
  title =	 {Combinatorial Auctions},
  publisher =	 {{MIT} Press},
  year =	 2006,
  abstract =	 {The study of combinatorial auctions -- auctions in
                  which bidders can bid on combinations of items or
                  "packages" -- draws on the disciplines of economics,
                  operations research, and computer science. This
                  landmark collection integrates these three
                  perspectives, offering a state-of-the art survey of
                  developments in combinatorial auction theory and
                  practice by leaders in the field. Combinatorial
                  auctions (CAs), by allowing bidders to express their
                  preferences more fully, can lead to improved
                  economic efficiency and greater auction
                  revenues. However, challenges arise in both design
                  and implementation. Combinatorial Auctions addresses
                  each of these challenges. After describing and
                  analyzing various CA mechanisms, the book addresses
                  bidding languages and questions of
                  efficiency. Possible strategies for solving the
                  computationally intractable problem of how to
                  compute the objective-maximizing allocation (known
                  as the winner determination problem) are considered,
                  as are questions of how to test alternative
                  algorithms. The book discusses five important
                  applications of CAs: spectrum auctions, airport
                  takeoff and landing slots, procurement of freight
                  transportation services, the London bus routes
                  market, and industrial procurement. This unique
                  collection makes recent work in CAs available to a
                  broad audience of researchers and practitioners. The
                  integration of work from the three disciplines
                  underlying CAs, using a common language throughout,
                  serves to advance the field in theory and practice.},
  keywords =     {economics combinatorial auctions classic},
  isbn = 	 {0262033429},
  googleid = 	 {XxFxLb5PEkEJ:scholar.google.com/},
  cluster = 	 {4688897840270872927}
}
Last modified: Wed Mar 9 10:16:33 EST 2011