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Title: | Combinatorial Auctions |
Editor: | Peter Cramton, Yoav Shoham, and Richard Steinberg |
Publisher: | MIT Press |
Year: | 2006 |
ISBN: | 0262033429 |
Abstract: | The study of combinatorial auctions -- auctions in which bidders can bid on combinations of items or "packages" -- draws on the disciplines of economics, operations research, and computer science. This landmark collection integrates these three perspectives, offering a state-of-the art survey of developments in combinatorial auction theory and practice by leaders in the field. Combinatorial auctions (CAs), by allowing bidders to express their preferences more fully, can lead to improved economic efficiency and greater auction revenues. However, challenges arise in both design and implementation. Combinatorial Auctions addresses each of these challenges. After describing and analyzing various CA mechanisms, the book addresses bidding languages and questions of efficiency. Possible strategies for solving the computationally intractable problem of how to compute the objective-maximizing allocation (known as the winner determination problem) are considered, as are questions of how to test alternative algorithms. The book discusses five important applications of CAs: spectrum auctions, airport takeoff and landing slots, procurement of freight transportation services, the London bus routes market, and industrial procurement. This unique collection makes recent work in CAs available to a broad audience of researchers and practitioners. The integration of work from the three disciplines underlying CAs, using a common language throughout, serves to advance the field in theory and practice. |
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@Book{cramton06a,
editor = {Peter Cramton and Yoav Shoham and Richard Steinberg},
title = {Combinatorial Auctions},
publisher = {{MIT} Press},
year = 2006,
abstract = {The study of combinatorial auctions -- auctions in
which bidders can bid on combinations of items or
"packages" -- draws on the disciplines of economics,
operations research, and computer science. This
landmark collection integrates these three
perspectives, offering a state-of-the art survey of
developments in combinatorial auction theory and
practice by leaders in the field. Combinatorial
auctions (CAs), by allowing bidders to express their
preferences more fully, can lead to improved
economic efficiency and greater auction
revenues. However, challenges arise in both design
and implementation. Combinatorial Auctions addresses
each of these challenges. After describing and
analyzing various CA mechanisms, the book addresses
bidding languages and questions of
efficiency. Possible strategies for solving the
computationally intractable problem of how to
compute the objective-maximizing allocation (known
as the winner determination problem) are considered,
as are questions of how to test alternative
algorithms. The book discusses five important
applications of CAs: spectrum auctions, airport
takeoff and landing slots, procurement of freight
transportation services, the London bus routes
market, and industrial procurement. This unique
collection makes recent work in CAs available to a
broad audience of researchers and practitioners. The
integration of work from the three disciplines
underlying CAs, using a common language throughout,
serves to advance the field in theory and practice.},
keywords = {economics combinatorial auctions classic},
isbn = {0262033429},
googleid = {XxFxLb5PEkEJ:scholar.google.com/},
cluster = {4688897840270872927}
}
Last modified: Wed Mar 9 10:16:33 EST 2011