@Article{clarke71a,
  author =	 {Edward H. Clarke},
  title =	 {Multipart pricing of public goods},
  journal =	 {Public Choice},
  year =	 1971,
  volume =	 11,
  number =	 1,
  month =	 {September},
  doi =		 {10.1007/BF01726210},
  googleid =	 {LUU_QlPfrbYJ:scholar.google.com/},
  abstract =	 {The free market has long been regarded as inferior
                  to other institutional devices for making resource
                  allocational decisions involving public
                  goods. Market failure comes about because direct
                  bargaining regarding an output which is indivisible
                  among users must result in explicit and unanimous
                  agreement among these users. Such agreements, which
                  involve multilateral bargains, may require
                  prohibitive transactions costs. In addition, the
                  cost of policing devices to exclude those not paying
                  may be high. If policing and exchange costs
                  associated with a market arrangement are too high,
                  substitute non-market devices may be preferred even
                  though information regarding consumer valuations,
                  generated by a market, may be sacrifices. Other
                  pricing devices, such as marginal benefit taxation,
                  which do not result in prohibitive police or
                  exchange costs, give rise to the classic ``free
                  rider'' or revealed preference problem whereby
                  individuals are induced to hide or understate their
                  true preferences in order to improve their
                  individual welfare while foregoing jointly available
                  protential gains. A device is proposed herein to
                  resolve these revealed preference and
                  exchange-policing cost problems. The proposed syste
                  requires an assignment by society of cost
                  responsibilities, which differes in important
                  respect from a usual specification of cost shares,
                  and relies on a multipart pricing procedure to
                  elicit reliable demand information.},
  keywords =     {economics mechanism-design},
  url = 	 {http://jmvidal.cse.sc.edu/library/clarke71a.pdf},
  cluster = 	 {13163422834560550189}
}