@InProceedings{chevaleyre05a,
  author =	 {Yann Chevaleyre and Ulle Endriss and J\'{e}r\^{o}me
                  Lang and Nicolas Maudet},
  title =	 {Negotiating over Small Bundles of Resources},
  booktitle =	 {Proceedings of the Fourth International Joint
                  Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent
                  Systems},
  crossref =	 {aamas05},
  pages =	 {296--302},
  year =	 2005,
  abstract =	 {When rational but myopic agents negotiate over the
                  exchange of indivisible resources, any restriction
                  to the negotiation protocol may prevent the system
                  from converging to a socially optimal allocation in
                  the general case. This paper addresses this issue by
                  analysing how the confinement to certain classes of
                  utility functions can enable agents to move to an
                  optimal allocation by negotiating over small bundles
                  of items at a time. In particular, we consider
                  so-called kseparable domains, where the full set of
                  resources can be divided into several preferentially
                  independent bundles of limited cardinality.},
  keywords =     {multiagent negotiation},
  url = 	 {http://jmvidal.cse.sc.edu/library/chevaleyre05a.pdf},
  googleid = 	 {sSxKp79hMFkJ:scholar.google.com/},
  cluster = 	 {6426744144031001777}
}