Vidal's library**Title:** | Bargaining Solution in a Social Network |

**Author:** | Tanmoy Chakraborty and Michael Kearns |

**Book Tittle:** | Proceedings of the Workshop on Internet and Network Economics |

**Year:** | 2008 |

**Abstract:** | We study the concept of bargaining solutions, which has been studied extensively in two-party settings, in a generalized setting involving arbitrary number of players and bilateral trade agreements over a social network. We define bargaining solutions in this setting, and show the existence of such solutions on all networks under some natural assumptions on the utility functions of the players. We also investigate the influence of network structure on equilibrium in our model, and note that approximate solutions can be computed efficiently when the networks are trees of bounded degree and the parties have nice utility functions. |

@InProceedings{chakraborty08a,
author = {Tanmoy Chakraborty and Michael Kearns},
title = {Bargaining Solution in a Social Network},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the Workshop on Internet and Network
Economics},
year = 2008,
abstract = {We study the concept of bargaining solutions, which
has been studied extensively in two-party settings,
in a generalized setting involving arbitrary
number of players and bilateral trade agreements
over a social network. We define bargaining
solutions in this setting, and show the existence of
such solutions on all networks under some natural
assumptions on the utility functions of the
players. We also investigate the influence of
network structure on equilibrium in our model, and
note that approximate solutions can be computed
efficiently when the networks are trees of bounded
degree and the parties have nice utility functions.},
url = {http://jmvidal.cse.sc.edu/library/chakraborty08a.pdf}
}

Last modified: Wed Mar 9 10:16:55 EST 2011