@Article{braun06a,
  author =	 {Norman Braun and Thomas Gautschi},
  title =	 {A Nash bargaining model for simple exchange
                  networks},
  journal =	 {Social Networks},
  year =	 2006,
  volume =	 28,
  number =	 1,
  month =	 jan,
  abstract =	 {Starting from exogenously given negotiation
                  networks, sociological exchange theories explain
                  bilateral divisions of fixed surpluses (e.g., cake,
                  dollar) as consequences of the partners' structural
                  embeddedness. In accordance with the available
                  experimental evidence, we focus on simple exchange
                  networks and present a formal model for predicting
                  profit splits from such structures. In contrast to
                  other approaches, we combine the generalized Nash
                  bargaining solution from game theory with the
                  assumption that both relational features and network
                  positions affect exchange outcomes. The resulting
                  point predictions for profit splits correspond
                  closely with experimental results obtained by Cook
                  et al.},
  url = 	 {http://jmvidal.cse.sc.edu/library/braun06a.pdf},
  doi = 	 {10.1016/j.socnet.2004.11.011}
}