@Article{binmore86a,
  author =	 {Ken Binmore and Ariel Rubinstein and Asher Wolinsky},
  title =	 {The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling},
  journal =	 {RAND Journal of Economics},
  year =	 1986,
  volume =	 17,
  number =	 2,
  pages =	 {176--188},
  abstract =	 {This article establishes the relationship between
                  the static axiomatic theory of bargaining and the
                  sequential strategic approach to bargaining. We
                  consider two strategic models of alternating
                  offers. The models differ in the source of the
                  incentive of the bargaining parties to reach
                  agreement: the bargainers' time preference and the
                  risk of breakdown of negotiations. Each of the
                  models has a unique perfect equilibrium. When the
                  motivation to reach agreement is made negligible, in
                  each model the unique perfect equilibrium outcome
                  approaches the Nash bargaining solution with
                  utilities that reflect the incentive to settle and
                  with the proper disagreement point chosen. The
                  results provide a guide for the application of the
                  Nash bargaining solution in economic modelling.},
  keywords = 	 {game-theory negotiation}
}