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Title: Allocating Uncertain and Unresponsive Resources: An Experimental Approach
Author: Jeffrey S. Banks, John O. Ledyard, and David P. Porter
Journal: The RAND Journal of Economics
Volume: 20
Number: 1
Pages: 1--25
Year: 1989
Abstract: We identify an important class of economic problems that arise naturally in several applications: the allocation of multiple resources when there are uncertainties in demand or supply, unresponsive supplies (no inventories and fixed capacities), and significant demand indivisibilities (rigidities). Examples of such problems include: scheduling job shops, airports, or supercomputers; zero-inventory planning; and the allocation and pricing of NASA's planned Space Station. Using experimental methods, we show that the two most common organizations used to deal with this problem, markets and administrative procedures, can perform at very low efficiencies (60-65%) efficiency in a seemingly robust example

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@Article{banks89a,
  author =	 {Jeffrey S. Banks and John O. Ledyard and David
                  P. Porter},
  title =	 {Allocating Uncertain and Unresponsive Resources: An
                  Experimental Approach},
  journal =	 {The {RAND} Journal of Economics},
  year =	 1989,
  volume =	 20,
  number =	 1,
  pages =	 {1--25},
  abstract =	 {We identify an important class of economic problems
                  that arise naturally in several applications: the
                  allocation of multiple resources when there are
                  uncertainties in demand or supply, unresponsive
                  supplies (no inventories and fixed capacities), and
                  significant demand indivisibilities
                  (rigidities). Examples of such problems include:
                  scheduling job shops, airports, or supercomputers;
                  zero-inventory planning; and the allocation and
                  pricing of NASA's planned Space Station. Using
                  experimental methods, we show that the two most
                  common organizations used to deal with this problem,
                  markets and administrative procedures, can perform
                  at very low efficiencies (60-65\%) efficiency in a
                  seemingly robust example). Thus, there is a need to
                  design new mechanisms that more efficiently allocate
                  resources in these environments. We develop and
                  analyze two mechanisms that arise naturally from
                  auctions used to allocate single-dimensional
                  goods. These new mechanisms involve
                  computer-assisted coordination made possible by the
                  existence of networked computers. Both mechanisms
                  significantly improve on the performance of
                  administrative and market procedures.},
  keywords =     {economics auctions},
  googleid = 	 {zIGoFSqT9Q8J:scholar.google.com/},
  url = 	 {http://jmvidal.cse.sc.edu/library/banks89a.pdf},
  cluster = 	 {1149987088824304076}
}
Last modified: Wed Mar 9 10:13:46 EST 2011