@Article{archibald06a,
  author =	 {James K. Archibald and Jared C. Hill and F. Ryan
                  Johnson and Wynn C. Stirling},
  title =	 {Satisficing Negotiations},
  journal =	 {{IEEE} Transactions on Systems, Man and Cybernetics,
                  Part {C}},
  year =	 2006,
  volume =	 36,
  number =	 1,
  pages =	 {4--18},
  abstract =	 {Negotiation procedures that are founded on the
                  doctrine of individual rationality, where each
                  participant is committed to maximizing its own
                  satisfaction, are limited in their ability to
                  accommodate the interests of others, and therefore,
                  may unnecessarily constrain the negotiability of a
                  decision maker, particularly in cooperative
                  environments. Satisficing game theory provides a
                  distinct alternative to the hyperrationality of
                  conventional rational choice by waiving reliance on
                  the individual rationality premise and offering an
                  approach to negotiatory decision making that is
                  based on a well-defined mathematical notion of
                  satisficing, or being good enough, that permits the
                  modeling of complex interrelationships between
                  agents. This approach provides a mechanism to
                  compute the attitude, or degree of conflict or
                  contentedness, of the negotiators. Examples
                  illustrate both single-round and multiround
                  satisficing negotiation protocols.},
  doi = 	 {10.1109/TSMCC.2005.860571},
  url = 	 {http://jmvidal.cse.sc.edu/library/archibald06a.pdf},
  cluster = 	 {17891152833955039061},
  keywords = 	 {multiagent negotiation}
}